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Summary  findings
Poor-area  developnment programs  -in  which the  household  level.  Second,  whether  an area is targeted
government  transfers  extra  resources  to unusually  poor  appears  to depend  heavilly on those same  area
areas - have been widely used  in efforts  to fight  characteristics.  The-re is a large omitted-variable  bias in
poverty.  There  has been some researcn  on such  prograrns  assessments  of program  irmpact that  do not  take account
but we know  little about  their  impact  on household  of differing  local conelitions.
living standards  over time.  jalan  and Ravatiun  use the  Generalized  Method  of
Jalan  and Ravallion  address  the issue for  a sizable  Marments to get a consistent  estimate  of a dynamic
poor-area  development  program  in rural  China.  China's  model  of cons-urrpt on growth  at the farm-household
program  had a significant  imripact  on rural  living  level.  Growth  is a funct.on  of whether  the county  of
standards  in the targeted  areas of the sample.  But this  residence  is included  ir  the program,  plus community
fact was not  evident  by comparing  the growth  rates of  and household  Ive  eit  al conditions  and covariate
consumption  in targeted  areas with growth  rates  shocks to fanr  y elds
elsewhere.  A simple  comparison  of the growth  rates  The  consurnprzon-growth  model  suggests that
suggested  that  although  the programz was successfully  households  living ir  areas targeted  by the program  had a
targeted  to poorer  areas,  it did nothing  to improve  their  higher  rate  of consurr.ption  growth  than  one would  have
position  relative to other  areas. There  were  strong  signs  otherwise  expected  '07ithout  the programi, the initial
of unconditional  (absolute and  relative) divergence  over  conditions  in those  arcas appear  to nave been so
time between  the areas  covered  by the program  and  unf1avorable that  ;ev w-ould have seen a decline in
those  that were  not.  average livi-ng star.dCads over  the period  studied.  The
There  are two  reasons  why these  signs of  gains  were  erough  to ontevnt  arn absolute  decline,  but
unconditional  divergence  are so misleading  about  not  enough  over five  ,-ears  to reverse the strong
program  benefits.  First,  there  are external  effects of  underlying  divergent  terindncies in the rural  econony.
initial area characteristics  on consumption  growth  at the
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Poor-area development  programs-whereby the government transfers extra resources to areas
which are deemed to be unusually poor-have  been widely used in public efforts to fight poverty.
While there has been some research on their performance in targetiang  poor areas and poor people,'
we know far less about their impact on household living standards over time.  Are such programs
merely short-term palliatives, or do they yield longer-term gains to poor areas?
The net impacts are unclear on a priori grounds.  There are likely dead-weight losses, such
as extra administrative costs and foregone incomes of participants.  Or the extra public resources
may displace other funds for investment with little or no net gain.  Furthermore, quantifying the
gains from a poor-area program is complicated  by the fact that a government's choice of the areas
covered could well be influenced  by outcome indicators subsequenily  used in the evaluation of the
program or on unobserved (by the researcher) determinants of the indicators themselves. 2
Why does a poor area exist?  The area may have suffered a shock.  But it appears to be at
least as common to find areas that are persistently poor over a long time.  Theories of economic
growth offer some clues as to why this may happen. The standard  Solow-Swan "exogenous" growth
model suggests that the answer lies in persistent spatial differences in technologies or the policy
environment, in the absence of which the lagging areas will eventually catch up even without factor
mobility.  A somewhat  richer set of explanations  for poor areas can be found in recent "endogenous
See Datt and Ravallion  (1993)  for India  and Ravallion  (1993)  for Indonesia. Lipton  and Ravallion
(1995, section  6) survey  past research  on these  programs  and other  direct interventions  common  in
developing  countries.
2  On the potential  bias in evaluation  when  program  placement  is endogenous  see Rosenzweig  and
Wolpin  (1986),  Pitt, Rosenzweig  and Gibbons  (1993)  and Besley  and Case (1994). The main difference
between  the problem  studied  by these  papers  and that studied  here is that we are concerned  with
identifying  dynamic  impacts  at the household  level in a situation  in which  program  placement  can be taken
to be exogenous  to household  decision  making.growth models".3  These predict that growth rates will also vary  with  initial conditions; factor
mobility will then be crucial to the prospects for poor areas.  Persistently poor areas can thus arise
from inequalities in community endowments. 4 Restrictions on mobility are not essential for that
outcome, but they make it more likely.  Living in a poor area can thus mean that a household is
more likely to be poor now and in the future ceteris  paribus.
This explanation for poor areas has a potentially important implication for assessing the
dynamic gains from area-specific  interventions  to reduce poverty. We will argue that farm-household
locations can be treated as exogenous in this setting, and we assume that no household is powerful
enough to have its locality declared poor.  Thus living in a designated poor area can be taken as
exogenous to household  choices.  However, the existence  of spatial externalities  may well entail that
the  growth path  of  future household living standards is  dependent on  the  same  community
characteristics which influence the public decision to declare the community  poor.  The problem is
essentially one of omitted-variable  bias when there is state-dependence  in the growth process. 5 For
example, a low endowment  of local public goods may simultaneously  induce a lower rate of growth
and a higher probability of the community  being declared poor.  Unless this is accounted for, the
value to households of living in an area which is targeted  under the program will be underestimated.
We address the above issues in the context of the sizable poor-area development program
found in rural China since the mid-1980s, though the approach we offer is more widely applicable.
The method we propose entails consistently estimating a dynamic model of consumption growth at
3  For an exposition  of both exogenous  and endogenous  growth  models  see Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995).
4  Models  of how this can  happen  have  been  provided  by Durlauf  (1992)  and Benabou  (1994).
5  By "state  dependence"  we mean  that initial  conditions-as  represented  by a dynamic  system's
initial  state vector-influence  the future  evolution  of that system.
2the household level using panel data.  The model allows us to test the dynamic impact on households
of  whether or not the area of residence is covered by the poor-area program, controlling for initial
conditions at both household and community level. 6
Models in which the first difference of a variable depends on initial conditions have been
popular in recent literature testing endogenous growth models on country- and regional-level data
sets. 7 There are a number of differences in our approach, some less important than others.  Here
we are analyzing  farm households  who  jointly produce  and consume, rather than economies in which
separate  consumers and  producers  interact through  trade.  But  this  is  largely  a  matter  of
interpretation; the separation of an economy into households (which consume) and firms (which
produce) is not essential in standard growth models. 8 In the present setting, the farm-household  can
be thought of as a small open economy, trading with those around it.
One advantage of using the household as the unit of observation is that one can identify
external effects of non-market community  goods on production processes at household level which
are otherwise lost in aggregation.  Another implication is that sitandard  growth-theoretic models
derive testable propositions about the steady state of an economy; in our setting one can allow for
deviations between the current year's data and the underlying model's steady-state solution, due to
shocks and/or adjustment costs.  We thus obtain a more powerful test of the impact of initial
conditions on the evolution of living standards than is possible by only modelling the long-run
6  While  it is common  to model  the variables  of interest  in first-difference  form, or as deviations
from their time means,  this is typically  done in the context  of a static  model  in levels,  for which  the time
slope  is a constant  and there are unobserved  fixed  effects. Clearly  such a formulation  is of little interest
here since  it does not allow  initial  conditions  to affect  the growth  path of the variable  of interest.
7  For references  and discussion  see Sala-i-Martin  (1994)  and BaITo  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995).
h  Standard  endogenous  growth  models  postulate  separate  households  and firms, but an equivalent
formulation  is possible  in which  households  both consume  and produce  (Barro  and Sala-I-Martin,  1995,
Chapter  2).
3average growth rates.  By using a Generalized Method of Moments estimator we are able to obtain
consistent estimates of a dynamic growth model on panel data under relatively weak assumptions.
The following section presents descriptive  results which motivate the later analysis.  We use
household data for four provinces of southern China 1985-90,  supplemented  by interviews with local
administrators and households in  fields trips during  1994-95.9  We find that an  unconditional
comparison of areas in southern China covered by the poor-area program and those not covered
suggests that the program has done nothing to help poor  areas catch up with  other areas-the
program benefits seem to have vanished. Section 3 aims to solve this mystery using a micro-model
of consumption growth which controls for both household-level  and community initial conditions.
Our conclusions  can be found in section 4.
2  The mystery of the vanishing program benefits
2.1  Background
The impressive economic growth in China as a whole since economic reforms in the late
1970s has been quite unbalanced regionally.  As a consequence progress in reducing poverty has
been far greater in some areas than others." 0 It can be argued that with greater mobility of the
factors of production, the lagging areas will start to catch up.  However, labor in China still appears
to be quite immobile, and there is a seemingly  wide-spread  perception that the more profitable areas
9  One or both of the authors  visited  a total of eight  counties  with at least two poor counties  in each
of the three poor provinces  (Guangxi,  Guizhou  and Yunnan).
10  For example,  Howes  and Hussain  (1994)  report  that the poorest  5% of rural China's  2200
counties  saw near-zero  growth  in average  income  over 1985-91.  For other  evidence  on China's regional
disparities  see Lyons  (1991),  Tsui (1991),  World  Bank  (1992),  Knight  and Song  (1993),  Rozelle  (1994)
and Howes  and Hussain  (1994). Data  problems  have confounded  past empirical  work,  though  Chen and
Ravallion  (1995)  find that (for southern  China)  the qualitative  conclusion  of rising disparities  and higher
poverty  in some  regions  persists  once  one corrects  for what  seem  to be the main  problems.
4for private investment  have tended to be the better-off ones, with the effect that regional inequalities
have increased in the process of  liberalizing private fmancial flows.  The local  (county-level)
administrators in poor counties of southern China we interviewed said it was rare for these areas to
receive private investment  from outside the county.
As a response to concerns about lagging poor areas, the central Govermnent introduced an
anti-poverty program in 1986 which declared that 272 counties were "national-poor  counties", and
targeted substantial aid to those counties.  The extra aid took the form of subsidized credit for
village-level projects (provided at well below market rates of interest), funding for public works
projects (under "food-for-work"  programs), and direct budgetary support to the county government.
This national poor area program is the main direct intervention in the central government's current
poverty reduction policy (Leading Group, 1989; World Bank, 1992; Riskin, 1994). At the province
level,  a  number of additional counties were  identified as  "provincial-poor" on relative-poverty
criteria, and also received extra aid from the provincial government, though these schemes often
operate quite separately in their funding and implementation.
The program is unlikely to benefit poor people in areas not covered, and there may well be
leakage to the non-poor in areas covered. Even with sizable regional disparities in average incomes,
the twin problems of imperfect coverage of the poor, and leakage to the non-poor, can greatly dull
the overall impact on poverty." 1 Though we throw some light on the targeting performance of
China's poor area program, that is not our main concern here.  IEstead we focus on assessing the
welfare gains over time in targeted areas.
"  In the four provinces  of China  which  we study  in this paper  over the period 1985-90,  roughly  half
of the poor (using  the definition  in Chen  and Ravallion,  1995)  did not live in counties  which  were
declared  poor either nationally  or provincially.
5Why might a poor area program induce a higher rate of consumption growth in the targeted
area?  The extra resources made available under China's program were not, of course, disbursed as
a lump-sum in 1986, but rather as an annual flow of monies beginning in that year.  Impacts on the
current rates of consumption  growth could then arise in two ways: the first is that the investments
under the program yield current returns, and the second is that--even if there was no net gain in
investnent,  and the program acts like a pure consumption transfer-a  rising flow of extra monies
over time will entail higher current consumption  growth.
In discussions with us, administrators emphasized the program's investment role; indeed,
explicit use of funds for current consumption  purposes is not allowed.  All of the specific projects
funded under the program mentioned in our discussions were investment  projects.12 Furthermore,
the real resource flow in the aggregate  from the national program was reasonably constant over the
period 1986-90 (at about Yuan 4.0 billion per year at 1985  prices).  These observations lend some
support to the first explanation  of any consumption-growth  gains in the program areas.
2.2  The setting for our analysis
We shall examine program impacts in the four contiguous provinces of Guangxi, Yunnan,
Guizhou and Guangdong, spanning the southern part of the country, between the South China Sea
and the borders with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. Three of the provinces (Guangxi, Yunnan and
Guizhou) are in South-West  China, widely regarded as one of the poorest regions of the country.
The fourth is the relatively affluent neighboring coastal province of Guangdong.
12  Oft  mentioned  projects  included  irrigation,  land  flattening,  land conservation,  planting  fruit trees,
livestock,  food processing,  and constructing  and maintaining  local roads.
6Data on the counties within these provinces were gathered from the cotnty yearbooks 1980-
87, and from the 1982 census data.' 3 We also know which counties within each province come
under either of the national or provincial poor-area development programs.  However, data on
precisely how much is spent on each county are not available.
According to the program's administrators,  the targeted counties were selected according to
their inferior socio-economic  conditions (Leading Group, 1989).  This assessrment  appears to have
been based entirely on administrative  and statistical data (though one cannot rule out the possibility
that administrative  records at local level may have been manipulated to help assure selection by the
center).  Our data do suggest that there was effective targeting to poor areas for the 44 program
counties among the 131 counties in our sample provinces. Gross rural social product per capita in
the declared poor counties was Yuan 351.93 (standard  deviation: 101.38) while in the other counties
it was 626.94 (standard deviation: 524.06).  Though the cultivated area per capita was virtually the
same in the two groups (approximately 1300  square meters), the grain yield in the program counties
was only two-thirds of that observed for the other counties, and the difference between the average
yields was statistically  significant. The infant mortality rate was 53.86 per 1,000 live births in the
declared poor counties compared with 39.08 per 1,000 live births in the non-program counties and
again the difference in  the averages was statistically significant.  Similarly, the proportion of
illiterates in  the  15+ population was higher in  the program areas (45.28%) relative to  others
(32.95%).  Finally, disaggregating the program counties into those covered under  the national
program and those under provincial programs, indicates that the former counties are worse off by
13  While the county  yearbooks  cover  rural areas, the census  counity  data does not separate  rural  and
urban areas. However,  given  that the objective  of including  the county  characteristics  is to control  for the
initial level of progress  in a particular  county  relative  to another,  the aggregate  county  indicators  should  be
reliable  proxies  for the differences  in socio-economic  indicators  across  the counties.
7all the above measures.  But the differences are generally small, and even the "province-poor"
counties are appreciably poorer than counties not covered under the program.
2.3  Looking for the benefits at household-level
In field trips during 1994-95,  one or both authors had informal, loosely structured, interviews
with about 25 poor households in a number of poor counties in the study area.  Amongst the
questions we asked was whether or not the household had seen any improvement  in its standard of
living over the last 10 years.  This is a highly subjective question and there is clearly sample-
selection bias, so the answers cannot substitute for good quantitative data for a random sample.
However, we were struck by how often the answer was "little or no gain", and that was consistent
with their meager dwellings  and clothing. While there was little sign of chronic hunger, there were
signs of persistent poverty.  Granted there have been impressive gains in rural China as a whole
since reforms began in the late 70's (World Bank, 1992), but it is believable that this process has
left many of the poorest behind.  (We also visited a number of better-off households who had seen
real gains since then.)  The signs we saw of both absolute and relative stagnation for the poorest
decile or so in rural areas of southwest China are consistent with the analysis of trends in poverty
measures based on sample data for the study area (Chen and Ravallion, 1995).
Since a substantial effort appears to have been made to raise living standards in poor areas
of this region since the mid-1980s, the above qualitative  observations suggest  that either the program
has failed, or it has for the most part only succeeded in preveniting  decline.  Our interviews with
poor households also suggested some factors  putting downward pressure on living standards in these
areas, including population pressure on limited land which is of poor quality and environmentally
8fragile, and cultivated under conditions of stagnant traditional technologies." 4 It is possible that the
program has prevented rising poverty.
To test that conjecture more rigorously, we shall use a balanced panel of observations on
6,651 households for each of six years, 1985-90. The panel is a new data sel:  constructed for this
purpose, from China's Rural Household Survey (RHS).  The Appendix describes the data further.
Table 1 gives mean expenditures by year, stratified  by whether  or not the county of residence
was declared poor in 1986. Figure 1 plots these consumptions. Counties declared poor were poorer
on average in all six years, and the gap between targeted counties and others actually grew over
time, both absolutely and relatively.  While in 1985, mean consumption per capita in the national
poor counties was 76% of that in counties not declared poor, the ratio had fallen to 70% by 1990.
Looking at Figure 1 it is very hard to see where the extra monies under the program have
gone.  There was a 3.0% gain in average consumption in nationatl-poor  areas in the year following
the introduction of the program, but this had largely dissipated by 1990.  There was little increase
in average consumption in the provincial-poor areas over the period.
These aggregates hide a marked regional difference between coastal and inland areas.  None
of the households in our Guangdong sample  belong to national poor counties. Moreover, the average
household consumption per capita in the declared-poor  counties of Guangdong  are higher than even
those for the non-poor counties of the other three provinces (Table 2).  The relative poverty criteria
applied at province level have clearly diluted overall targeting performance. The unconditional  rate
of growth of consumption per capita of the targeted counties in Guangdong is also higher (between
1985-90, mean real consumption increased by 21 %) than observed for the excluded counties of the
14  While  fertility  has fallen  considerably  in China  this has been less pronounced  in poor rural areas,
particularly  amongst  the national  minorities  (which  are in fact a majority  of the rural population  in much
of southwest  China.)
9other three provinces.  Also the difference in average consumption  per capita between the national
poor and the province poor counties vanishes once we exclude Guangdong. However, divergence
is still evident in Table 2; excluding Guangdong, average consumption  decreased by 4% over 1985-
90 in areas declared poor, but increased by 3.2% elsewhere.
So these descriptive results suggest that while the program did select poorer counties, it did
nothing to help them catch up.  However, before accepting this conclusion, we must first establish
that the growth path in those counties which were not covered by the program is  the relevant
counter-factual for evaluating the impact of the program.  If there are divergent tendencies in the
regional economy-as  may well be the case in present-day rural China-then  it can be argued that
initially poorer  counties would have grown at an  even  slower rate  if  not  for  the poor-area
development program.  Next we test that conjecture.
3  The mystery solved?
State dependence  in the growth process has implications  for assessing  the dynamic gains from
a poor-area program.  Poor areas may have higher growth through a process of convergence, so that
we overestimate the return to being covered under the program by simply comparing growth rates
in targeted areas with those elsewhere.  Or there may be divergence, in which case the test will
underestimate the value of being targeted.  Thus, even when living in an area declared poor can be
taken as exogenous at the household level, there is still a selection  bias in assessing  household-level
imnpacts  over time.  The only way around this problem is to find a method of controlling for the
initial conditions which create the troublesome state dependence.' 5
"5  This is an example  of the general  problem  of selection  bias in program  evaluation;  for discussion
of this problem  and corrective  actions  see Barnow  et al., (1980)  and Heckman  and Robb (1985).
103.1  A micro-econometric  model of consumption growth
A fully-specified theoretical model capable of motivating our empirical analysis can be
formulated by a re-interpretation  of the Romer (1986) model of enciogenous  grovvth  under increasing
returns to  scale through externalities. 16 Analogously to the role of firm-specific knowledge and
external (economy-wide)  knowledge in Romer's model, one can conjecture thal: output of the farm
household is a concave function of various privately-provided inputs, but that output also depends
positively on the level of community  capital.  On fully accounting;  for all private inputs (all profits
being reckoned as payments for those inputs), there will then be constant returns to scale to the
privately provided inputs, but increasing returns to scale for overall inputs, including community
capital.  With the farm-household maximrizing  an inter-temporal utility sum--with instantaneous
utility depending  on current consumption,  which must be partly forgone to assure future output-one
can derive an endogenous consumption  growth rate which depend on the initial endowments of both
private capital and community  capital, as well as preference and production parameters.  With this
re-interpretation, the results on existence  and welfare properties of equilibrium in Romer (1986) can
be applied to the present problem.
This type of theoretical model is consistent with simultaneously convergent effects with
respect to private capital and divergent effects with respect to coimmunity  capital; a higher private
capital stock will entail a lower marginal product of private capital and, hence, lower consumption
growth in equilibrium, while a higher stock of community  capital will entail higher marginal product
of private capital and higher growth.  In more general formulations, the direction of the effects of
initial conditions will probably be more difficult to predict on a priori grounds, and will depend on
16  Also see Lucas  (1988). For theoretical  expositions  of this type of growth  model  see Hammond
and Rodriguez-Clare  (1993),  and Barro and Sala-i-Martin  (1995).
11(inter-alia) how well markets work (credit market imperfections, for  example, cail entail that
liquidity-constrained  households cannot realize the same growth potential as others) and the political-
economy of local public policy (it has been argued that higher initial inequality, for example, may
promote policy choices which inhibit growth)."  However, the essential dependence  of household-
level growth rates on both internal and external initial conditions appears likely to hold in all except
rather special cases.
In carrying such a formulation  to data, it would also be unrealistic to assume that the growth
rate actually observed at any date is the equilibrium  (steady  state) value predicted  by initial conditions
alone.  Here we allow short-run divergence from the steady state by postulating an autoregressive
distributed lag structure for the growth process, augmented for exogenous shocks and unobserved
effects.  On introducing dynamics and both time-invariant  and time-varying  unobserved effects, the
model we estimate is (in time-series  parlance) a modified AD(l, 1) (autoregressive  distributed lag of
order 1) model of the form (in levels):
Incj, = ce +  a,.t  +  3 Inc,jtl  + Fy 0'Xit  +  'Y 1xit-  + 6, npi.t + 62  pp,.t +  O'zi.t +  ,0i  + uil  (1)
for household i (= 1,..,N) at date t (= 1,..T),  where c,, is consumption  by i at date t, xi, is a (lxk)
vector of time-varying explanatory variables, np, is the dummy for the national poor county, ppi is
the dummy for the provincial poor county, zi is a p-dimensional  vector of other initial conditions,
and 77i is a time-invariant household-level fixed effect.'8 The vector z; comprises both countv-
17  For a review  of the arguments  and evidence  on such  effects  see Bruno  et al., (1995).
18  An AD(l,  1) model  is chosen  over an alternative  model  with a longer  lag structure  because  the
Wald test on the second  lag coefficient  is not significant.
12specific factors (initial values of community capital) and household-sRecific  characteristics (initial
values of private capital).
The problem of estimating this model is different from the usual "withinr"  estimator for panel
data.  It is known that the ordinary least squares estimator of an autoregressive fixed effects model
is not consistent for a typical panel where the number of periods is small and where the asymptotics
are driven by the number of cross-sections  going to infinity (Hsiao, 1986). The inconsistency arises
because of the potential correlation between the lagged endogenous variables and the residuals in the
transformed model." 9 Instead we use the Generalized Methoi  of  Moments (GMM) technique
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to estimate equation (1).
Notice that, unlike the standard AD(1,1) model, the error term in (1) has two components:
an unobserved individual specific time-invariant fixed effect, iij,  and the standard innovation error
term,  ui,.  We assume that  the unobserved individual specific effect  qij  is  correlated with  the
regressors, i.e., E(i 7jzj), E(i7lx 1 t), and E(,qilnci,,)  are non-zero. 20 The error ui, is serially uncorrelated
and thus satisfies the orthogonality  conditions:
E(lnci,ui 1) =  E(xiSux)  = 0  for s < t  (2)
These conditions ensure that lagged values of Inch  and xit  can be used as instauments. In order to
get consistent estimators, the unobserved fixed effects ,qi need to be eliminated.  This is done by
taking the first differences of (1) to obtain the transformed model:
'9  The inconsistency  is of order (lIT) (where  T is the number  of time periods)  and hence  if the
number  of periods  is large enough,  the asymptotic  bias of the least suares estimator  will tend to zero.
However,  as mentioned  earlier, in our case, the number  of time periods  is finite and short, and thus we
cannot  escape  from the asymptotic  bias created  by the least squares  dummy  variable  models.
20  Bhargava  and Sargan  (1982)  estimate  a dynamic  random  effects  model  where they  assume  that at
least some  of the time-varying  variables  are uncorrelated  with the unobserved  individual  specific  effect.
13Ainci, =  a,  +  9Alncj,,l  +  To'AXit  +  ')l'AXit-,  +  1 flPi  +  62 ppj +  O'Zj +  Aui 1 (3)
GMM methods are used to estimate the parameters in equation (3).  Given that the uA,'s  are
serially uncorrelated, the GMM estimator is the most efficient one within the class of instrumental
variable (IV) estimators.  In estimating (3), Inci, 2 or higher lagged values (wherever feasible) are
valid instrumental variables.  Thus typically the coefficient estimates of the parameter vector r  =
(a19 01  7019  ,1,  6 2, 9) are given by:
v =  (q'w a, w')q'  (q'w an w'Ac)  (4)
where q  =  [e, Ac-, Ax.,  np,  pp, z]',  is the set of regressors with e'  a vector of ones, w is the
matrix of instrumental variables, a. is the weighting matrix,  (p,s) are the appropriate lags on the
time-varying instruments, and Ac is the (NTxl) vector of the first differences of log consumption.
From Hansen (1982) it follows that the optimal choice of a,  ("optimal" in the sense of giving the
most efficient estimator asymptotically)  is proportional to the inverse of the asymptotic  covariance
matrix.2'  Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors are computed using the residuals from a first-
stage regression to correct for any kind of general heteroscedasticity.
Inferences on  the estimated parameter vector  v are  appropriate provided the  moment
conditions used are valid.  Sargan's (1958) and Hansen's (1982) over-identifying  restrictions (chi-
square) test is implemented  to test that the over-identifying  restrictions are consistent with the data.
In addition, a second-order  serial correlation test (the test-statistic for this test is normally distributed)
21  In the just-identified  case (i.e. in the case  where  the number  of moment  conditions  are exactly
equal  to the number  of parameters  to be estimated),  the parameter  estimates  do not depend  on the
weighting  matrix and hence  the choice  of a, is redundant.
14is constructed given that the consistency of the GMM estimators for the first  differenced model
depends on the assumption that E(Au 1t Auit. 2)  =  0.22
In estimating this model we will assume that all initial area characteristics (npi, ppi and zi)
are exogenous to the household-level  growth process.  The main way in which this may fail to hold
is through mobility, whereby households  choose their area characterisics. In rural China there have
been long-standing restrictions on mobility.  Since the 1950s, China has had laws which restrict
access  to  employment and  public  services according to  one's  officially registered  place  of
residence. 23 From our discussions with rural households ancd  others familiar with the setting it
appears to be very unusual for a whole family to move on its own accord; the mobility that does
occur involves a single worker within the household.
3.2  Estimates of the model and implications  for program performance
The most important time-varying  exogenous variables in.  an under-developed  rural setting are
agro-climatic conditions.  We measure these by the average grain yield per unit area at the county
level.  Change in demographics  within the household is proxied by change in household size (though
the current year's household size is treated as endogenous). Province-specific  year dummies are also
included to pick-up province-specific shocks.
According to the program's administrators, the targetecl  counties are characterized by lower
socio-economic conditions. Given that these characteristics  are potentially correlated with a county
22  There may be some first-order  serial  correlation,  i.e., E(AuJ-Au.,)  may not be equal to zero since
Auit  are the first differences  of serially  uncorrelated  errors. Alternatively,  if ulif  is a random  walk, then
there should  not be any serial  correlation  in the first differenced  Auat.
23  These  laws were relaxed in the early 1990s,  to allow  employment  in cities for rural workers.
Significant  constraints  on mobility  persist  though;  registrtaion  in urban areas  is still difficult  and costly  to
obtain,  and unregistered  workers  have highly  restricted  access  to urban servives  (they  typically  cannot
send  their children  to urban schools,  for example).
15being declared poor or not, excluding these variables from our model will lead to an omitted variable
bias in the parameters of interest, as discussed in the introduction. The direction of the bias depends
on  the sign of  the partial correlation coefficient between the poor  counties and  the excluded
variables.24
To deal with this source of bias, we first estimated a probit model at the county level. Our
binary variable takes a value of 1 if it is a declared poor county (either national or provincial poor)
and 0 otherwise. Available  county characteristics  are included as explanatory  variables in this probit
model.  The characteristics included were wealth per capita, fertilizer usage per square kilometer of
cultivated area, irrigated area per square kilometer of cultivated area, electricity usage per capita,
cultivated area per caita, total population of the county, and agricultural machinery used per square
kilometer of the cultivated area. Among the initial county conditions,  wealth per capita and fertilizer
usage per square km of cultivated area were signifcant. 25 We thus used these two variables to proxy
for the wide range of county characteristics in the GMM model.  Finally, household-level initial
wealth per capita was also included, to control for differences in initial capital at the household level
(under diminishing marginal returns this should have a negative coefficient).
In Table 3, we report the GMM estimates. The results show that there is divergence in the
growth rates insofar as the county initial conditions are concerrned,  but across households there is
convergence. We interpret these results as indicating  decreasing returns to "own wealth" at the farm-
household level, combined with positive effects of "community  wealth' on the marginal product of
I  If the partial  correlation  coefficient  between  the included  and the excluded  variable  is zero, then
the coefficient  associated  with the included  variable  will be unbiased,  but the variance  of the estimated
parameter  would  still be biased,  thereby  making  it impossible  to conduct  valid inferences  on the estimated
coefficients.
25  Both  variables  are sample  means  from the (roughly  one third larger)  cross-sectional  surveys  from
which  the panel was drawn. The wealth  variable  is defined  as the sum of the values  of fixed  productive
assets, cash, deposits,  housing,  grain  stock, and stock of durables,  all at year end.
16own wealth and (hence) consumption growth.  There is weakly significant serial dependence in
consumption growth, with 0.11 (t-ratio: 1.68) of last period's growth rate being transmitted to the
current period.  Higher current and lagged grain yields at the county level are reflected in higher
household-level  growth rates.  The strength of these effects suggests that households are exposed to
sizable uninsured yield risk.
Controlling for initial community  and household-level  factors, the results in Table 3 indicate
that household-level consumption growth rates tend to be significantly higher in counties initially
declared poor under the national program.  The short-run effect entails a  1.1 percentage point
increase in the growth rate of consumption,  rising to 1.35 in steady state.  However, there is no sign
of any significant effect of being targeted under the provincial  program.
This is a substantial gain in the rate of growth; indeed, since the actual rate of growth in the
national-poor areas was close to zero over the whole period (Figure 1), these results suggest that
without the program we would have seen a net contraction of a similar absolute magnitude in the
areas designated poor under the national program.
But the resource flow under the program was also substantial.  Fromr  data provided by the
government, we estimate that Yuan 26 per person per year was spent on the program in the national
poor areas of our four provinces during the period 1985-90. This comprises the center's outlays on
credit,  public works and so on, but excludes administration costs, and any local "top-up" funds
provided from county resources to augment the center's outlay (such top-up funds appear to be
impossible to measure).  Our model indicates  a 1.  1% per year gain in consumption, representing an
average gain in national poor areas of Yuan 3 per person per year over the period.  Thus, these
calculations suggest that about one fifteenth of the current budgetary outlay is being reflected in
17household consumption in the targeted areas.  Assuming that the outlays are solely for investment,
the marginal rate of return is 12%.
This could well be an overestimate.  For one thing, there are public expenditures on the
program which have not been accounted  for, as noted above. Also one should also be cautious about
interpreting these as  "long-run" gains since we may actually be seeing at least partly the direct
consumption gains from a rising flow of monies; when the program stops, the gains will stop.  As
we  discussed in  section 2,  the program is  designed to  finance investment in  poor areas,  not
consumption  directly, though there could well be a degree of fungibility  for recipients. Interpreting
our results as evidence of long-run gains is also problematic given that we have only five years of
data after the program began; although our estimator should be unbiased in even such short panels,
it is always hazardous  to project too far beyond the sample  period.  Suffice to say that there is strong
evidence here of dynamic gains, though over what period is a more moot point.
3.3  Further tests
i) If we are right about the bias arising from ignoring spatial state dependence in assessing
dynamic gains at the household level, then our results should change considerably when we drop
initial county conditions from the regression. That is what we found. Dropping initial county wealth
and fertilizer usage from the regression in Table 3, the dummy variable for national poor counties
became highly insignificant (a t-ratio of 0.6), while that for provincial poor counties became highly
significant, but negative ('  =-0.0097, with a t-ratio of -2.44).  This confirms that a large bias can
occur in assessments of the gains from poor-area programs which do not take account of how
community characteristics can influence  household-level  outcomes.
18ii) The gain to living in a county covered under the program may vary by characteristics of
households.  On a priori grounds it is difficult to predict which way such effects would go; on the
one hand, poorer households  may have more chance of receiving aid through targeting efforts within
declared-poor counties; but on the other hand, they may be less well positioned to get a good rate
of return to that aid due to lack of complementary  assets and s]kills. We re-estimated the model
allowing interaction effects of the dummy  variable for "national  poor" counties with initial  household
wealth included in the unrestricted GMM model.  The interaction term was insignificant, indicating
no pro-poor targeting.
iii) Possibly there are also indirect impacts on household-level  growth rates, via the average
grain yield in the county.  We tested this by GMM regressions of the log of yield against its own
lagged value and county initial wealth. Both the dummy  variables for "national  poor" and provincial
poor" counties were highly insignificant (t-ratios of 0.89 and 0.86 respective]y). So there do not
appear to have been indirect effects via agricultural productivity.
4  Conclusions
China's poor-area development  program had a significant impact on rural living standards
in the targeted areas of our sample. However, this fact is not evident by comparing the growth rates
of consumptions  in targeted areas versus others.  That comparison  suggests that-while  the program
was successfully targeted to poorer areas-it  did nothing to improve their position relative to other
areas.  Indeed, there are strong signs of unconditional (absolute and relative) divergence over time
between the areas covered by the program and those not.  There are two reasons why these signs
of unconditional  divergence  are so deceptive  about  program benefits: firstly, there are external effects
of initial area characteristics on consumption  growth at the household level, and, secondly, whether
19or not an area is targeted appears to depend heavily on those same area characteristics.  Thus there
is a large omitted-variable bias in assessments of program impact which do not take account of
differing local conditions.
To support these claims, we used the Generalized  Method of Moments to obtain a consistent
estimate of a model of consumption growth at the farm-household  level.  Growth is a function of
whether or not the county of residence is included in the program, plus community and household-
level initial conditions and covariate shocks to farm yields.  We find that the higher the initial
household wealth, the lower the subsequent  rate of growth; this is consistent with diminishing  returns
to own capital.  By contrast, the lower the community's initial average wealth, the lower  the
subsequent  rate  of  household  consumption growth  ceteris  paribus,  suggesting  that  better
endowements of community  capital raise the marginal returns to investment  at the household level.
The consumption-growth  model also suggests that households living in areas targeted by the
program had a higher rate of consumption  growth than one would have otherwise expected. Indeed,
without the program, the initial conditions in these areas appear to have been so unfavorable that we
would have seen a decline in average living standards over the period.  The gains were enough to
prevent absolute decline.  But they were not enough over the five years to reverse the strong
underlying divergent tendencies in the rural economy.
20Appendix: The household-level data
The household panel data set was constructed from China's Rural Household Survey (RHS),
conducted by the State Statistical Bureau since 1984.  The sampled households were not changed
over the period 1985-90, though this fact does not appear to have been previously exploited to form
a  panel.  However, the sample was rotated in  1991, so we cannot construct a  longer panel.
Constructing the panel from the annual RHS survey data proved to be more difficult than expected
since the identifiers could not be relied upon.  Relatively stringent criteria were used in defining a
panel household, with extensive cross-checks to assure that the same household was being tracked
over time.  Fortunately, virtually ideal matching variables were available in the financial records,
which gave both beginning and end of year balances.  The relatively few ties by these criteria could
easily be broken using demographic  data.
The RHS is an unusually good quality survey in some respects, notably in the care that goes
into reducing both sampling and non-sampling  errors.  A randoni sample of counties is drawn, and
then of villages within counties, and households  within villages, and a number of checks indicate that
it can be considered representative (Chen and Ravallion, 1996).  Sampled houtseholds  keep a daily
record of all transactions, as well as log books on production.  Interviewing assistants visit each
sampled household every two weeks to check on their progress and collect the data.  Checks are
made at the county statistical office, with return visits to the households when necessary.
However, there are also some problems  in the RHS's valuation  and accounting  methods, most
notably the fact that grain consumption from own production was valued at administrative prices
which were below-and  progressively diverged from-market  prices for grain actually sold.  Also
the survey processing assigned lumpy expenditures on housing an,d  consumer durables to the current
year even though these typically deliver benefits over many years.  These problems have been
21corrected  in the data set used  here, by reprocessing  the raw data (Chen  and Ravallion,  1996). The
value of grain produced  by the household  but not marketed  has been valued  at the county  median
selling-price. And the service flows  from housing  and consumer  durables  have been imputed  by
amortizing  the asset values. All expenditures  have been  converted  to constant  1985  prices using a
province-specific  rural Consumer  Price  Index.
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25Table 1: Consumption  per person  in areas declared  poor versus those not
Year  All households  Not living  in areas  Living  in areas  Living in  Living in
(6651  households)  declared poor  declared  poor  "provincial-poor'  "national-poor"
(4411  households)  (2240  households)  areas  areas
(1139 households)  (1101 households)
1985  318.01  337.39  279.52  293.03  265.84
(327.63)  (360.51)  (223.28)  (227.65)  (213.69)
1986  328.39  351.81  281.85  302.72  260.59
(354.81)  (384.15)  (253.76)  (270.91)  (223.40)
1987  342.81  368.94  290.97  313.15  268.47
(384.39)  (411.71)  (285.99)  (328.02)  (222.14)
1988  344.17  371.10  290.51  313.75  267.12
(387.16)  (417.92)  (276.89)  (309.76)  (224.77)
1989  344.20  373.54  285.98  313.37  258.18
(419.45)  (449.67)  (309.35)  (354.00)  (237.59)
1990  340.80  370.77  281.12  305.19  256.51
(428.11)  (467.49)  (290.58)  (331.22)  (227.45)
Note: In Yuan per person per year in 1985  prices, with standard  deviations  in parentheses.Table 2: Comparison  of consumption  per person in Guangdong  with Guangxi, Guizhou and Yunnan
7
Year  Guangdong  Guangxi,  Guizhou  and Yunnan
(1,604 households)  (5,047 households)
Not living  in areas  Living in areas  j Not living  in areas  Living in areas  Living in areas declared  Living in areas
declared  poor  declared  poor  declared  poor  declared  poor  "national"  poor  declared provincial
(1,263 households)  (341 households) 1 (3,148 households)  (1,899 households)  (1101  households)  poor (798 households)
I
1985  429.38  339.51  300.14  268.64  265.84  272.63
(467.98)  (241.33)  (257.08)  (209.51)  (213.69)  (203.34)
1986  475.95  380.66  301.42  264.00  260.59  268.79
(472.59)  (301.02)  (256.87)  (218.33)  (223.40)  (210.75)
1987  500.19  413.69  315.51  268.88  268.47  269.45
(503.75)  (397.01)  (281.06)  (223.41)  (222.14)  (225.28)
1988  482.67  408.74  325.26  269.20  267.12  272.19
£AOA  gQ  (341.48)  (324.71)  (229.59)  (224.77)  (236.04)
1989  501.05  429.67  *  320.46  260.01  258.18  262.60
(594.09)  (436.12)  (297.06)  (232.69)  (237.59)  (225.76)
1990  515.18  410.05  l  310.01  257.71  256.51  259.39
(598.21)  (410.95)  *  (307.07)  (325.34)  (227.45)  (216.88)
Note: In Yuan  per person per year in 1985  prices, with standard  deviations  in parentheses.Table 3: GMM estimates
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic
Constant  -0.21486  -6.09
Lagged  dependent  variable  0.10790  1.68
Change  in (log) county  yield  0.29765  3.50
Lagged  change  in (log) county  yield  0.36090  4.13
Change  in household  size  -0.16223  -2.87
Lagged  change  in household  size  -0.06209  -0.91
Declared  national  poor county  0.01217  2.71
Declared  provincial  poor county  -0.00374  -0.92
Initial (log) average  county  wealth  per capita  0.04303  7.84
Initial (log) household  wealth  per capita  -0.00901  -3.11
Fertilizer  usage (county)  per sq km of cultivated  area, 1985  0.00026  0.90
Province  interacted  time-dummies
Guangdong  1988  -0.06954  -5.90
1989  -0.03233  -2.23
1990  -0.07565  -4.48
Guangxi  1987  0.042834  3.80
1988  0.00802  0.50
1989  -0.10712  -7.61
1990  -0.12385  -4.27
Guizhou  1987  0.03283  2.15
1988  0.06429  3.64
1989  -0.04506  -3.05
1990  -0.06959  -3.08
Yunnan  1987  -0.00895  -0.64
1988  -0.06088  -3.79
1989  -0.00262  -0.16
1990  -0.10910  -6.47
Second order serial correlation  test statistic  0.39
Sargan-Hansen  overidentification  test statistic  15.96
(degrees  of freedom  in parentheses)  (d.f. =7)
Notes:  The dependent  variable is the first difference  of the log of consumption  per
capita. The instruments  used for lagged  consumption  per capita, current  and lagged  yield
variables and current household size were ci.2(one moment condition), yieldi, 2 (one
moment  condition)  and lagged household  size (one  moment condition).Figure  1: Mean  consumptions  in areas
targeted  by the program  and those not
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